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The Court's relaxed standard of review is part of a series of
holdings that highlight the increased importance of the trial itself,
Capital defendants in Virginia are no less worthy than Boyde of six days
of mitigation testimony. Such presentation in Virginia often consumes
less than a day. Furthermore, Virginia trial courts are not even required
to provide capital juries as much information about the meaning and
scope of mitigation as is contained in California's catchall phrase. It is
the duty of counsel to inform the jury through evidence, argument, and

proposed jury instructions (a) that it may consider non-crime related
evidence and base a sentence of life on that evidence and (b) that in
Virginia the jury may fix punishment at life even if satisfied that both
aggravating factors have been proven.
Summary and analysis by:
Steven K. Herndon

McKOY v. NORTH CAROLINA
110 S. Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
The Superior Court of Stanly County, North Carolina, convicted
DockMcKoyofthefirst-degreemurderofadeputy sheriff and sentenced
him to death in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000 (1988).
McKoy appealed his sentence to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
basing his constitutional challenge of North Carolina's sentencing
procedures on Mills v. Maryland,486 U.S. 367 (1989). See case summary of Mills v. Maryland,CapitalDefenseDigest,Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 11
(1988). In Mills, the United States Supreme Court reversed a death
sentence imposed under Maryland's capital punishment statute because
the sentencing scheme could have precluded ajury from considering any
mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a
particular mitigating circumstance. McKoy v.North Carolina,110 S. Ct.
1227 (1990). TheNorth CarolinaSupreme Court affirmedboth McKoy's
conviction and sentence. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Id.
NORTH CAROLINA'S SENTENCING SCHEME
In the sentencing phase of McKoy's trial, the trial court instructed
the jury, both orally and in a written verdict form, to determine unanimously four issues which would ultimately be used in the determination
of the sentence. The instructions with Issue One required that the jury
indicate "yes" to every aggravating circumstance listed that it had found
unanimously from the evidence and beyond areasonable doubtand "no"
as to all circumstances not so found. The jury found as aggravating
circumstances that McKoy previously had been convicted of a felony
involving violence and that the instant murder was committed against a
deputy sheriff while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
Issue Two similarly required the jury to agree unanimously on the
existence of every mitigating circumstance listed and to indicate its
decision by marking "yes" or "no" on the verdict form. The jury found
as mitigating that McKoy's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was
impaired. The jury also found that his borderline intellectual abilities
were mitigating. However, the jury did not unanimously agree on the
existence of several other mitigating factors raised by the defendant and
he was therefore denied consideration of them.
Because the jury found the existence ofmitigating circumstances,
it was instructed to proceed to Issue Three which required the jury to
decide unanimously whetherthe mitigating circumstances unanimously
found in Issue Two were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury in Issue One. The jury answered "yes"
to this question and so proceeded to the final Issue.
Issue Four asked whether the jury unanimously found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by the jury
were sufficiently substantial to warrant the imposition of the death
penalty when weighed against the mitigating circumstances found by
the jury. Again, the jury answered "yes." In accordance with the verdict

form and instructions, thejury subsequently made abinding recommendation of death.
In ruling on McKoy's direct appeal of his sentence, the North
Carolina Supreme Court rejected McKoy's challenge which was based
on Mills. Id. at 1228. The court distinguished North Carolina's sentencing scheme from the Maryland scheme, the subject of Mills. State v.
McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12 (N.C. 1988). Maryland's scheme, declared
invalid by the Supreme Court, requiredthe jury to impose the death
penalty if itfound at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating
circumstances or, alternatively, if it unanimously agreed that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors. Id. at 33.
The North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that Issue 4 allowed a
jury to return a recommendation of life imprisonment if it felt that the
aggravating circumstances did not call for the death penalty, even if the
jury found aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. Id.
HOLDING
The Supreme Courtfound thatNorth Carolina's sentencing scheme
impermissibly limited the jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence.
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1228. The unanimity requirement is a violation of
the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment
because it allows one juror to prevent others from giving effect to
evidence that thejuror might believe suggests a sentence less than death.
Both Issues Three and Fourrestrictthejury's consideration ofmitigating
factors to those found unanimously under Issue Two. Id. at 1233. The
Court emphasized that, in contrast to the narrowly defined standards on
which a sentencer may rely to impose the death penalty, the Constitution
strictly limits a State's ability to narrow the sentencer's discretion to
consider relevant evidence that might persuade it to decline to impose
the death penalty. Id. at 1234 (citing Penryv. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934
(1989)).
Mills and McKoy require that each juror be permitted to consider
any evidence in mitigation of the offense. See Skipperv. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (death penalty schemes must allow
consideration of any aspect of the defendant's character or record and
any circumstances that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less
than death). Additionally, Mills and McKoy require that each juror be
permitted to give effect to mitigating evidence when deciding the ultimate question of life or death. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1233.
The High Court vacated McKoy's death sentence and remanded
the case to the North Carolina Supreme Court for resentencing.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
McKoy is not directly applicable to Virginia because Virginia's
sentencing scheme does not formally require jurors to weigh the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances to determine
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the appropriate sentence. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(1990). However,
the Virginia verdict form does instruct the jury to consider both aggravating and mitigating evidence. Further, Virginia law permits juries to
fix the penalty at life in prison even if aggravating circumstances are
found. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135 (1978). In
this respect, a "balancing" of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
almost certainly takes place.
In both Mills and McKoy, the Court stated that it is irrelevant
whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all mitigating
evidence is imposed by statute, by the sentencing court, orby evidentiary
ruling. Whatever the cause, a procedure that impedes consideration of all
the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death penalty.
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1233 (citing Mills, 486 U.S. at 375).
Notably, Virginia's verdict form and model instructions may act
as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence. The Virginia
verdict form lists statutory aggravating factors for consideration. The
form generally refers to mitigating evidence but fails to explain the effect
mitigating evidence can have on the sentence. The model instructions do
not discuss evidence in mitigation at all. While the jury may consider

any mitigating circumstances, it is, in fact, uninformed as to what
constitutes a "mitigating factor."
Therefore, by close analogy, the Virginia model instructions and
verdict form may act as an impermissible barrier to a juror's ability to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence no less than the verdict
form and instructions which the Court struck down in McKoy.
Fortunately, the Court reiterated in McKoy that its decision regarding the consideration of mitigating evidence is not limited to those
cases in which the jury is requiredto impose the death penalty if it finds
that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or
that no mitigating circumstances exist at all. McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1232.
Counsel should consider preparing alternative jury instructions to
properly inform the jury of its obligation to consider all mitigating
evidence and of its ability to impose a sentence less than death under any
circumstances. Defense counsel should also be prepared to object to the
model jury instructions as a barrier to consideration of mitigation
evidence.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. McInerney

WHITMORE v. ARKANSAS
110 S. Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS

HOLDING

Ronald Gene Simmons was sentenced to death for multiple
homicide by an Arkansas court and fied a petition requesting expedited
review and waiver of his direct appeal. Simmons specifically requested
permission both to waive the appeals process and receive the death
penalty as soon as possible. SeeFranzv.State,296 Ark. 181,754S.W.2d
839 (1988). Arkansas has no rule requiring mandatory direct appeal of
capital case convictions and sentences, and the Arkansas Supreme Court
granted the requests. Jonas H. Whitmore, another death row inmate,
convicted of robbery-murder, had exhausted his direct appellate review,
been denied post-conviction relief, but had not yet initiated federal
habeas corpus proceedings. Whitmore attempted to intervene in Simmons'
case with a two-part argument claiming both direct interest in the
outcome and "next friend" status to assert the claims of Simmons.
Whitmore's direct interest approach asserted that the execution of
Simmons without appeal would violate his own eighth and fourteenth
amendment rights because Arkansas has a comparative review ofcapital
cases. This is achieved at the appellate level by comparing records in
Arkansas capital cases in an effort to ensure that the sentence of the
appellant is not disproportionate to the sentence of others similarly
situated. The comparative review is compiled from records of the direct
appeal procedure. It is this procedure which Simmons was permitted to
waive.
Whitmore reasoned that his injury arose from his future habeas
corpus appeal. He argued that if his future habeas corpus proceedings
resulted in a remand to state court and in that court he was sentenced to
death a second time, he would be entitled to a second comparative review
at the state level. At that putative review, Simmons' case would not be
in the pool of cases consulted, because Simmons waived his right to the
appeals process. The absence ofSimmons'case, therefore, couldprejudice
Whitmore because Whitmore would not be reviewed in comparison
with a possibly more culpable Simmons. He claimed this could result in
an unjust capital sentence. Reasoning on another personal standing
issue, Whitmore sought to intervene as an Arkansas citizen interested in
preserving constitutional governance. Alternatively, Whitmore sought
to enter into the case as Simmons' next friend.

In a seven to two decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
(Justice Marshall,joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting), the Court held
that Whitmore lacked standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court
directly and that Whitmore could not bring an appeal for Simmons as
next friend.
The Court stated that in order to invoke the intervention of a
federal court in Simmons' case with respect to Whitmore's claimed
constitutional violations, Whitmore had to pass the "cases and controversies" requirement of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. The Court
set out the criteria necessary to meet the requirement: 1) demonstrate
injury-in-fact. Whitmore would have to show that Simmons' waiver of
his appeal would be directly responsiblefor Whitmore's execution. 2)
Satisfy the "causation andredressability" prongs of Article m. Whitmore
would have to show how entering Simmons' case would result in a
different sentence, infact, for Whitmore.
The Court decided that Whitmore's argument was too speculative
to pass the Article III tests because the prospect of injury was not certain
enough. The CourtnotedthatArkansas' comparativereviewhadrecorded
capital punishment for others in Whitmore's class. Other persons
convicted ofrobbery-murder under similar fact scenarios to Whitmore's
have been sentenced to death in Arkansas, Whitmore's attempt to enter
under an interest in constitutional governance was also held to be too
generalized.
The Courtthen addressedWhitmore's attempttojoin as Simmons'
next friend. The Court outlined a two-part test for achieving next friend
status. First, the would-benext friendmust"provide adequate explanation
- such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability - why
the real party in interest cannot appear." Whitmore, 1727. Second, the
next friend must be "truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he seeks to litigate."Id., 1727. The Court added that there
is a heavy burden on the seeker to demonstrate the propriety of the next
friend status. Id., 1727.
Whitmore was unable to meet either requirement of the test. On
several occasions, Simmons stated his intention not to appeal and his
desire for execution. He also underwent psychiatric evaluation that

